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Global warming heats up the
American-Canadian relationship:
Resolving The Status of the
Northwest Passage Under
International Law
ABSTRACT
Global warming is turning the hypothetical Northwest Passage
into a reality. Shipping that utilizes the Northwest Passage can save
over 4000 miles in travel, with the attendant economic benefits.
However, the legal status of the Northwest Passage, in particular the
portion of the Northwest Passage which cuts through the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago, remains indeterminate and is a source of
contention between the United States and Canada. Canada takes the
position that the Northwest Passage is internal Canadian waters,
while the United States takes the position that the Northwest Passage
constitutes an international strait. While these two positions have
strengths and weaknesses, it is likely that the two nations will
continue to defer a final resolution of this issue and either continue
with the status quo or seek a diplomatic solution.
William Y. Kim'

Introduction
On September 14, 2007, the European Space Agency announced
that analysis of satellite imagery showed that the accelerating
shrinkage in ice cover had opened up the Northwest Passage, a "short
2
cut between Europe and Asia that had been historically impassable.
Using the Northwest Passage had previously been considered
commercially impractical due to multi-year pack ice that rendered
navigation hazardous or impossible.' However, lured by the savings of
almost 4000 miles compared to the Panama Canal route, international
shipping is already attempting to use the Northwest Passage. 4 These
1.

J.D, Michigan State University College of Law.

2.

ESA Portal - Satellites witness lowest Arctic ice coverage in history,
(1ESA.INT, http://www.esa.int/esaCP/SEMYTC13J6F-index0.html
ast visited Dec. 6, 2010).

3.

Michael Byers & Suzanne Lalonde, Mounting Tension and Melting Ice:
Exploring the Legal and Political Future of the Arctic. Who Controls the
Northwest Passage?, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1133, 1135 (2009)

4.

See James Kraska, The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest
Passage, 22 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 257, 258 (2007);

1'

developments inject new tension into the disagreement between the
United States and Canada over the status of the Northwest Passage
under international law.
Canada takes the position that the Northwest Passage constitutes
internal Canadian waters, which gives them broad authority to
regulate and restrict maritime traffic through the Northwest Passage.'
In contrast, the United States takes the position that the Northwest
Passage constitutes an international strait, with international
shipping having the right of transit passage.6 While it is currently
unlikely that either the United States or Canada would be willing to
submit this dispute to an international tribunal, the dispute in the
Northwest Passage showcases the difficulty that even closely allied
neighbors can face in protecting their own interests under
international law.
Part I of this article provides a historical overview of the
Northwest Passage and prior disputes between the United States and
Canada regarding the Northwest Passage. Part I analyzes the
development of international law relevant to the Northwest Passage
dispute. Part III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
positions held by the United States and Canada. Part TV will
conclude by examining the practical limitations on resolving this issue
through an international tribunal.
I. The History of the Northwest Passage
A. GeographicalBackground

The Northwest Passage refers to the body of Arctic water that
connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans along the northern coast of
North America.7 It stretches from the Bering Strait in the west, runs
along the northern coast of Alaska and Canada, and then weaves
through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago until it exits through the
Davis Strait and Baffin Bay in the east.8 Since European colonization
of North America began, explorers have sought a usable route around
the northern coast of North America.9 However, arctic weather
Commercial Ship Sails Through Northwest Passage, CBC NEWS,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/11/28/nwest-vessel.html
(last visited Dec. 6, 2010).
5.

MICHEAL BYERS, WHO OWNS THE ARCTIC? 43 (2009)

6.

Id. at 42.

7.

See, e.g. The Northwest Passage Today, Of Maps and Men: In Pursuit of a

Northwest

Passage,

http://libweb5.princeton.edu/visual materials/

maps/websites/northwest-passage/nwp-today.htm

2010).
8.

Id.

9.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 36-37.

(last

visited Dec. 6,

conditions created insurmountable barriers for early explorers,
particularly the multi-year pack ice common in the waterways that
did not melt during the summers, but instead built up year after
year."
B. Successful Navigations of the Northwest Passage
The first successful transit of the Northwest Passage took three
years of hard sailing and was completed by Roald Amundson in
1906." In the wake of this accomplishment, the Canadian government
made a formal claim to possession of the lands and islands within the
Northwest Passage using a "sector" theory of sovereignty. 2 However,
this sector claim has never been recognized internationally.' 3 While
the United States formally protested this sector claim, the practical
difficulties of navigating the Northwest Passage meant that no real
confrontation between Canada and the United States occurred. 4 It
did, however, mark the first time that Canada made the claim that
the waters of the Northwest Passage constituted "internal Canadian
waters" as well as the first United States rejection of this claim.
No ship would repeat Amundson's achievement for nearly four
decades, until the St. Roch, with Henry Larsen of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police in command, successfully navigated the Northwest
Passage. 5 The 1950s marked the first transit of the Northwest
Passage by a ship flying the United States flag, when the U.S. Coast
Guard cutter Storis successfully transited the Northwest Passage in
1957.6 Four years later, in 1961 the U.S.S. Seadragon completed the

10.

Id.

11.

Id. at 37. All prior attempts to navigate the Arctic passage failed. Id.

12.

See John Kennair, An Inconsistent Truth: Canadian Foreign Policy and the
Northwest Passage, 34 VT. L. REV.
15, 23-24 (2009); Luke R.
Peterson,
International Strait or Internal Waters? The Navigational
Potential of the Northwest Passage, PROCEEDINGS

OF

THE

MARINE

SAFETY COUNCIL, Summer 2009, at 44, 47. Both articles note that the
Canadian government no longer attempts to use the sector theory to
claim sovereignty over the Northwest Passage.
13.

Peterson, supra note 12 at 47.

14.

Canada, DOD 2005.1-M MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, 96
at
available
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/20051m_062305/canada.doc
(last visited Dec. 6, 2010) [hereinafter MARITIME CLAIMS]; Kennair,
supra note 12 at 24.

15.

16.

Canada at

War:

The

Arctic:

Northwest Passage, 1944, TIME.COM,

(lahttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,801448,00.html
st visited Dec. 6, 2010).
Storis, 1942, USCG.MIL, http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Storis
1942.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2010).

first submarine transit of the Northwest Passage. 7 As the 1960s drew
to a close, Exxon sent a specially modified super-tanker, the S.S.
Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage in an experiment to test
the viability of the Northwest Passage as a commercial shipping
route. 8 Although neither Exxon nor the U.S. government sought
Canadian permission for this voyage, the Canadian government
preemptively granted permission anyways. 9
In the wake of the Manhattan's voyage, the Canadian government
enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) in
1970.20 Although international law at that time did not recognize
coastal state rights further than twelve nautical miles from shore, the
AWPPA imposed requirements on all shipping within 100 miles of
Canada's Arctic shore.2' Shortly thereafter Canada attempted to
propose legislation at the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) that would have validated the range of the
AWPPA. 22 However, this proposal was rejected by the IMCO.23
Canada's efforts met with greater success in the 1982 UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with the adoption of Article 234,
which granted coastal states additional rights over ice-covered seas
within their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).24 However, at least one
scholar noted that while this gives coastal nations the right to enact

17.

Dictionary

of

American

Naval

Fighting

Ships:

Seadragon 1I,

HISTORY.NAVY.MIL,
http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/s8/seadragon-ii.
htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2010). It is notable that this is one of the few
instances where the course taken by a submarine is publicly available,
since submarine operations are classified by the U.S. government and
are thus generally unavailable. See, e.g. Byers & Lalond, supra note 3 at
1177.
18.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 44-45.

19.

Id. At the
territorial
outside of
in ice and

time, international law only recognized a three-mile limit for
seas, and the S.S. Manhattan's projected route was entirely
hat three-mile limit. However, the Manhattan became trapped
required the assistance of the Canadian icebreaker John A.

MacDonald. Because

of this

assistance, the Manhattan was forced

enter Canadian territorial waters
Princess Royal Islands. Id. at 45.

by coming within

to

three miles of the

20.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 46.

21.

Id. Byers also notes that Canada effectively admitted that these
requirements violated international law at the time by taking steps to
prevent the matter from being litigated at the I.C.J. Id.

22.

Kennair, supa note 12 at 17.

23.

Id.

24.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 234, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 561.

environmental legislation protecting the waterways, it fails
entirely to
25
address the question of sovereignty over those waterways.
C. The Voyage of the PolarSea: The Northwest PassageDispute Comes to a
Head

The Northwest Passage dispute between Canada and the United
States came to a head in 1984, when the U.S. informed Canada that
the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea would utilize the
Northwest Passage to sail from Thule, Greenland to its home port of
Seattle, Washington.2 6 The United States clearly stated that its
notification was a courtesy and did not constitute recognition of the
Canadian position regarding the Northwest Passage.27 While Canada
was inclined to work with the United States to address logistical
concerns regarding the Polar Sea, Canadian public opinion forced
Canada to take a more confrontational posture. 8
Diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Canada
eventually led to the 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. 9 While
neither nation conceded the validity of the other's position regarding
the status of the Northwest Passage, the Agreement did specify that
the United States would only operate icebreakers within the
Northwest Passage with Canadian consent.3" The Agreement on
Arctic Cooperation did not apply to any ships besides icebreakers,
and explicitly preserved each nation's original position regarding the
Northwest Passage.3
D. Recent Developments in the Northwest Passage

Since the implementation of the 1988 Agreement on Arctic
Cooperation, neither the United States nor Canada has forced a
confrontation over the status of the Northwest Passage. However, the
European Space Agency's announcement that sea ice in the
Northwest Passage had shrunk to the point that the Northwest
Passage could be considered open raises the specter of increasing
commercial use of the Northwest Passage. 2 An increasing number of
25.

Kennair, supra note 12 at 18.

26.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 51.

27.

Id.

28.

Id. at 51-52.

29.

Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Jan. 11, 1988, 60 U.N.T.S.
1995.

30.

Id.

31.

Id. The Agreement on Arctic Cooperation also states that all icebreakers
are also by definition research vessels, and both nations agreed to share
information gained from the research activities of their icebreakers. Id.

32.

ESA Portal, supra note 2.

commercial vessels, including cruise ships, have utilized the Northwest
Passage in the past decade. 3
Currently, registration of ships using the Northwest Passage is
voluntary under Canadian law, with approximately 98% of shipping
complying. 4 In 2008, Canadian Prime Minister announced that
Canada would be making registration mandatory.3" However, Canada
has of yet not done so, potentially due to United States' concerns
about validating Canada's claims to sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage. 6 The increased commercial traffic and Canada's attempt to
regulate it makes it increasingly likely that the formal status of the
Northwest Passage under international law will become an issue of
concern for both the United States and Canada.
II. The Northwest Passage and International Law
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
("I.C.J.") recognizes three primary sources of international law. 7
First, the I.C.J.recognizes "international conventions," which are
usually formulated as treaties, but which could include conventions,
protocols, and declarations. Second, the I.C.J. recognizes international
customs where those customs are accepted as a general practice
required by law. Third, the I.C.J. recognizes the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations. In addition, Article 38 also
identifies as a "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law"
prior judicial decisions and the teachings of the publicists.38
A.

Treaties Alone Cannot DetermineInternationalLaw in the
Northwest Passage

With the exception of the previously mentioned Agreement on
Arctic Cooperation, there are no treaties concerning the Northwest
33.

See,

e.g. Frank Luba, Cruise Trips to Northwest Passage on Rise,
http ://www.theprovince.com/Cruise+trips+Northwest+Passage+rise/3827493/story.html
(last
visited Dec. 6, 2010);
Captain Mark
Behrend, Logbook of the Northwest Passage, HLCRUISES.COM, http://www.hl-cruises.com/redwork/do.php?layoutid= 100
&node=275236&language=2 (last visited Dec 6, 2010); I s' Commercial
Ship Sails Through Northwest Passage, supra note 2.
THEPROVINCE.COM,

34.

Byers, supra note 5 at 70-71.

35.

Id. at 71.

36.

Id. at 71-72. A spokesperson for the United States embassy stated that
"[w]e want to ensure that any enhanced protection of the Canadian
Arctic marine environment is achieved in a manner that is consistent
with the international law of the sea." Id. at 72.

37.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), 26 June 1945,
59 Stat. 1055.

38.

Id.

Passage that bind both the United States and Canada.39 While as a
body of water the Northwest Passage would seem to fall within the
purview of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
United States has not yet ratified the UNCLOS.4 ° Thus, despite the
fact that Canada ratified the UNCLOS on November 7, 2003, the
failure of the United States to ratify the UNCLOS prevents it from
being considered international law by virtue of its status as a binding
treaty.4' While both the United States and Canada are signatories to
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (CTSCZ),
a predecessor of the UNCLOS, Article 311 of the UNCLOS
and thus keeps the CTSCZ
specifically supersedes its predecessors
42
from being binding upon Canada.
The 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, while binding both
the United States and Canada, is a document of extreme brevity.
Only a page and a half long, the agreement contains very few
applicable provisions, and those provisions are both specific and
limited. After the customary introductions, paragraph 3 focuses on
the substance of the treaty:
3. In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their
two countries, the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the
opportunity to increase their knowledge of the marine
environment of the Arctic through research conducted during
icebreaker voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective
icebreaker navigation off their Arctic coasts:
The Government of the United States and the Government
of Canada undertake to facilitate navigation by their icebreakers
in their respective Arctic waters and to develop cooperative
procedures for this purpose;
-

The Government of Canada and the Government of the
United States agree to take advantage of their icebreaker
navigation to develop and share research information, in
accordance with generally accepted principles of international

-

39.

Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra note 29.

40.

Chronological List of Ratifications of Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and the Related Agreements as at 15 November 2010,

http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference files/chronological lists of ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20
on%20the%20Law%20of/o20the%2OSea (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
Id.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 311, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter CTSCZ].
UN.ORG,

41.
42.

law, in order to advance their understanding of the marine
environment of the area;
- The Government of the United States pledges that all
navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada
to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the
Government of Canada. 43
A careful reading of the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation reveals
that its scope encompasses only icebreakers of the United States and
Canada. Commercial shipping, private craft, and non-icebreaker
military vessels are excluded from the Agreement. Furthermore, both
nations specifically reserved their original positions regarding waters
in question and prevented the Agreement from affecting their
respective positions through Article 4."
No other treaties relating to the Arctic waters or the Northwest
Passage have been registered with the United Nations. Thus, it is
clear that there is no treaty binding both the United States and
Canada which can be used to determine international law applicable
to the Northwest Passage dispute.
B. The United States Largely Accepts the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
as Customary InternationalLaw

Despite the failure of the United States government to ratify the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, this failure is not due to an
overall rejection of the UNCLOS. Instead, the United States objected
to Part XI of the UNCLOS, particularly as it dealt with mineral
45
exploitation of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
The United States accepts most of the UNCLOS as codifying
customary international law. 46 This position was recently reaffirmed
by United States diplomats participating in the Arctic Ocean
Conference, held in Ilulissat, Greenland in May of 2008. 4' Thus, the
43.

Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra note 29.

44.

Id. Paragraph 4 reads, "Nothing in this agreement of cooperative
endeavor between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice
thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the
United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other
maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties." Id.

45.

Rachael E. Salcido, Law Applicable on the Outer Continental Shelf and in
the Exclusive Economic Zone, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 407, 409 (2010).

46.

See, e.g. Letter from David Wilkins, Ambassador of the U.S., to Peter
Boehm, Assistant Deputy Minister, N.Am., Dep 't of Foreign Affairs &
Int'l Trade (Can.) (Oct. 27, 2006), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/98836.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2010); Kraska, supra
note 4 at 263.

47.

Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, Green., May 27-29, 2008, Ilulissat
Declaration (May 28, 2008), in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009

UNCLOS, although not a treaty binding both the United States and
Canada, can largely be viewed as a codification of customary
international law. As such, both the United States and Canada would
be bound by those provisions that are determined to be customary
international law, despite the United States
failure to ratify the
48
UNCLOS.
1. Treatment of "Internal Waters" Under the UNCLOS

Canada's position is that the Northwest Passage constitutes
"internal waters." Article 8 of the UNCLOS defines internal waters '4as
"waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea. 9
Article 8 makes an exception for archipelagic states, of which Canada
does not qualify." However, Article 7 of the UNCLOS allows for the
drawing of straight baselines where "there is a fringe of islands along
the coast in its immediate vicinity."5 In 1985, one month after the
voyage of the Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage, the
Canadian Foreign Minister announced that Canada would use
straight baselines to determine the limits of Canada's internal
waters. 2 Canada's baselines surrounded the entirety of the Canadian
Arctic archipelago, thus covering that portion of the Northwest

Passage.
Several nations, including the United States, protested Canada's
claim on the basis that the baselines were excessively long and
diverted too much from the direction of the mainland coast.53 This
position relies on the third paragraph of Article 7, which states that
"[t]he drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any
154, 154 (Danish Inst. for Int'l Studies ed., 2009). The Declaration
affirmed the commitment of the participating nations (Canada,
Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States) to
the "existing legal framework" of the "law of the sea." Id. Of those five
nations, only the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS. Status of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN.ORG,
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status2O1O.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
48.

See, e.g. North Sea Continental Shelf, Merits (Ger./Neth.; Ger./Den.),
1969 I.C.J. 2 (Feb. 20). The judgement in the North Sea Continental
Shelf case discussed the manner in which a treaty, which had not been
ratified by Germany, might still be considered to codify customary
international law and thus bind Germany. Id. at 14-16.

49.

UNCLOS, art. 8.

50.

UNCLOS, art. 46. Essentially, states composed of a continental
landmass with a nearby archipelago cannot be considered archipelagic
states under the UNCLOS. Id.

51.

UNCLOS, art. 7, para. 1.

52.

BYERS,

53.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 53-54.

supra note 5 at 52.

appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea
areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently linked to the land
54
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.
Canada, by declaring that the Northwest Passage was internal
Canadian waters, sought the ability to exercise its sovereignty over
the waters of the Northwest Passage, in accordance with Article 2 of
the UNCLOS 55 This sovereignty is not unlimited; in particular,
Article 18 of the UNCLOS establishes the right of "innocent passage"
for foreign ships. 6 "Innocent passage" is defined by the UNCLOS to
mean "navigation through the territorial sea" for the purpose of
traversing that sea in a "continuous and expeditious" manner.57
Innocent passage must also be conducted in a manner that is "not
prejudicial to the peace."58 Articles 21 through 26 give the coastal
state a wide variety of powers (and some limitations) to regulate and
oversea shipping through internal waters.
In addition, Canada also invokes Article 234 of the UNCLOS,
which grants coastal states additional rights to regulate waters in icecovered areas for the purpose of preventing, reducing, or controlling
pollution. 9 This article was a compromise added at the behest of
Canada, which sought the additional legitimacy for its ability to
protect its claimed waters from pollution. 0 Canada originally sought
to enshrine its sovereignty claims over the Northwest but could not
gain enough support for its position. 6' However, the applicability of
Article 234 may itself be in question, since it deals specifically with
"ice-covered areas." Since the effect of global warming, and the
underlying reason for the heightened concern regarding the Northwest
Passage, is the loss of surface ice, it is uncertain as to whether Article
62
234 still applies.
54.

UNCLOS, art. 7, para. 3.

55.
56.

UNCLOS, art. 2.
UNCLOS, art. 18.

57.
58.

Id.
UNCLOS, art. 19. Article 19 also lists a variety of actions incompatible
with
innocent passage, including researching, fishing, intelligence
gathering, and the use or threat of use of force. Id. In addition,
submarines must travel on the surface and identify themselves.
UNCLOS, art. 20.
UNCLOS, art. 234. Article 234 is restricted to areas "where particularly
severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for
most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation." Id.

59.

60.
61.
62.

See Kennair, supra note 12 at 17-18; Kraska, supra note 4 at 274.
Kennair, supra note 12 at 17-18
See, e.g. Peterson, supra note 12 at 46; Byers & Lalonde, supra note 3 at
1200-01. It is interesting to note that the scholars from Canada

2. Treatment of "International Straits" Under the UNCLOS
The position of the United States is that the Northwest Passage
constitutes an international strait, with foreign vessels having the
right of transit passage.63 Article 37of the UNCLOS applies to "straits
which are used for international navigation between one part of the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high
seas or an exclusive economic zone." 64 In regards to the Northwest
Passage, the applicable high seas are the Atlantic Ocean on the
eastern end of the Northwest Passage, and the Pacific Ocean on the
western end.
If it is classified as an international strait, foreign ships would
enjoy the right of transit passage, defined as "the freedom of
navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and
expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas...
and another part of the high seas."65 Ships exercising the right of
transit passage are required to comply with a number of conditions,
including proceeding through the strait without delay, refraining from
the threat or use of force, refraining from activities beyond those
incident to normal transit, and compliance with international
regulations for safety and pollution control.66 In addition, ships
exercising transit passage may not conduct research or surveys
without the permission of the coastal state.67
Coastal states are also restricted in their ability to regulate an
international strait where the right of transit passage exists. Article
41 specifically gives coastal states the right to designate sea lanes to
prescribe traffic separation schemes when necessary.6" In addition,
Article 42 allows coastal states to adopt laws and regulations with
respect to safety, pollution, fishing, and customs-related activity.6 9
However, these laws and regulations may not discriminate against
foreign ships and their application cannot have the practical effect' of
"denying, hampering, or impairing the right of transit passage. "70
Transit passage may also not be suspended.7
(Byers & Lalonde) and the United States (Peterson) have noted this
uncertainty.
63.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 42.

64.

UNCLOS, art. 37.

65.

UNCLOS, art. 38, para. 2.

66.

UNCLOS, art. 38, para. 1-2.

67.

UNCLOS, art. 40.

68.

UNCLOS, art. 41.

69.

UNCLOS, art. 42, para. 1.

70.

UNCLOS, art. 42, para. 2.

71.

UNCLOS, art. 44.

While, under the UNCLOS, transit passage is only possible
through an international strait, an international strait does not
automatically allow for transit passage. Article 35 limits the scope of
transit passage by excluding "any areas of internal waters within a
strait, except where the establishment of straight baselines . . . has

the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not
previously been considered as such." 72 The key question thus becomes
whether or not the Northwest Passage was considered internal
Canadian waters prior to Canada's application of straight baselines.
It is also unclear whether Article 234 of the UNCLOS applies to
international straits, because the negotiators did not expressly deal
with the issue.73 While Article 234 itself is written in broad manner
that could encompass international straits, Article 42, which governs
the "laws and regulations of states bordering straits relating to transit
7' 4
passage," specifically limits itself "to the provisions of this section.
However, Article 42 then goes on to list pollution as an acceptable
subject for regulation, although with a more limited scope.7" This lack
of clarity in the UNCLOS creates additional potential for conflict over
the legal status of the Northwest Passage. The UNCLOS also creates
an additional loophole in pollution-related laws and regulations for
military vessels used only in governmental, non-commerical service.76
C. Relevant Prior Judgments from the InternationalCourt of Justice

While prior decisions of international tribunals are not binding
precedent, those decisions are a "subsidiary means for the

72.

UNCLOS,

art.

35(a).

Article

36

of the

UNCLOS

also

excludes

international straits where an alternative route "of similar convenience
with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics" exists.
UNCLOS, art. 36. No such alternative route exists in relation to the
Northwest Passage.
73.

Byers & Lalonde, supra note 3 at 1182-83.

74.

UNCLOS, art. 42.

75.

UNCLOS, art. 42(1)(a). Article 42 allows the coastal state to give effect
"to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil,
oily wastes, and other noxious substances." Id. Article 234 does not
include the restriction of "giving effect to applicable international
regulations. UNCLOS, art. 234.

76.

Kennair, supra note 12 at 18. Kennair notes that when the Canadian
government attempted to use Article 234 of the UNCLOS to justify
regulation of ships through the Arctic ice shelf, the United States
government responded by pointing out that Article 236 of the UNCLOS
provided a sovereign immunity clause. Id. This sovereign immunity
clause specifically exempts military vessels from provisions of the
UNCLOS regarding protection and preservation of the environment.
UNCLOS, art. 236.

determination of rules of law."77 The principles used by the I.C.J. in
two cases have a direct bearing on the issues involved in the dispute
over the Northwest Passage. These cases have been cited by both the
United States and Canada in support of their respective positions.
1. The Norwegian Fisheries Case - Defining Appropriate Straight
Baselines
The Norwegian Fisheries case was decided by the I.C.J. in 1951.78
It involved a dispute between the United Kingdom and Norway over
fishing rights, in particular how the presence of Norway's
"skjaergaard," a collection of rocks, islands, and reefs, affected the
delineation of Norwegian territorial waters through the drawing of
straight baselines.7 9 The United Kingdom disputed Norway's use of
straight baselines to enclose the entire skjaergaard as territorial
waters, instead arguing that the baselines must be drawn on the "lowwater mark on permanently dry land which [was] a part of Norwegian
territory, or the proper closing line of Norwegian internal waters."8
The court rejected this contention, stating that geographic realities
dictated that outer lines of the skjaergaard must be taken into
account when delimiting Norwegian territorial waters.8'
The United Kingdom also argued that if baselines could be used,
then each baseline could be no longer than ten nautical miles.82 This
contention was also rejected by the I.C.J., which noted that while the
ten-mile rule enjoyed a certain amount of support, it had "not
acquired the authority of a general rule of international law."83 The
I.C.J. also refused to endorse any particular system of drawing
baselines, instead noting that "the coastal State would seem to be in
the best position to appraise the local conditions dictating the
selection."84
Another pertinent point involved the United Kingdom's attempt
to define portions of the waters in the skjaergaard as a strait, which
77. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), 26 June
1945, 59 Stat. 1055.
78. Fisheries, Judgment (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 5 (Dec. 18).
79. Id. at 21-23.
80. Id. at 24.
81. Id. at 25-26. The I.C.J. justified this decision by noting that the western
sector of the mainland was bordered by the skjaergaard and thus
constituted a whole with the mainland. Id. The I.C.J. later explicitly
gave its sanction to Norway's drawing of baselines between the outer
islands of the skjaergaard. Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
83. Id. at 32.
84. Id. at 33.
82.

would have prevented Norway from classifying them as internal
waters.85 The United Kingdom argued that the portions followed by
the Indreleia navigational route constituted a maritime strait. 6
However, the I.C.J. noted that the Indreleia was more accurately
described as "a navigational route prepared as such by means of
artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway."87 Given that, the
I.C.J. declined to treat the Indreleia differently than the other waters
of the skjaergaard.88
After finding that the Norwegian government had not violated
international law by drawing straight baselines, the I.C.J. then
proceeded to expound on the characteristics of valid straight baselines
under international law.89 The court first noted that land granted a
coastal state the right to the waters off its coast. Thus, "while such a
State must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to
adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements, the
drawing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general direction of the coast."9" The court noted that a second
consideration would be the relationship between "sea areas and the
land formations which divide or surround them."9 1 Finally, the court
noted that considerations beyond "purely geographic" factors are
valid, such as economic interests evidenced through historical usage.92
After determining the basic rules of permissible baselines, the ICJ
then examined how Norway had created its system, what effect
Norway's system had against the United Kingdom, and whether it
was applied in a way that conformed to international law.93 By using
a variety of historical documents, the court established that Norway
had established a coherent system for establishing baselines stretching
back to 1812, and that this system had been encountered no

85.

Id. at 33-34.

86.

Id. at 34.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.
Id. at 34-35. The I.C.J. noted that these characteristics, "though not
entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for their
decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse, facts in question." Id. at
35.

89.

90.
91.

92.
93.

Id. at 36.
Id. The court further clarified this point by stating that "[t]he real
question raised in the choice of base-lines is .. .whether certain sea
areas lying within those lines are sufficiently closely linked to the land
domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters." Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 38.

opposition from other states.94 Furthermore, the United Kingdom's
position in the North Sea, the United Kingdom's own interests, and
the United Kingdom's failure to protest against early iteration of the
the United
against
Norwegian position justified enforcement
95
Kingdom.
When examining whether Norway's baselines conformed to
international law, the I.C.J. gave great weight to Norway's historical
claims that marginalized the United Kingdom's concerns that the
baselines deviated too severely from the general direction of the
Norwegian coast.96 Additionally, it found that the "vital needs of the
supported by "ancient and peaceful usage" could
population,"
legitimately be taken into consideration when determining whether
the baselines were "moderate and reasonable."97 Taking all of its
findings into consideration, the I.C.J. found that baselines drawn by
Norway were permissible under international law.98
2. The Corfu Channel Case - What is an International Strait
Decided in 1949, the Corfu Channel case involved a dispute
between the United Kingdom and Albania.99 The case emerged from
an incident in 1946 when a squadron of British warships departed
from the port of Corfu and proceeded through the North Corfu
Channel, where they struck mines. 10 The mines were encountered
while the British ships were transiting through Albanian territorial
waters." 1 A substantial portion of the Corfu Channel decision
addressed the question of whether the Albanian government was
responsible for the mines which had damaged the British warships
and whether the court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty. 102 It is,
however, the second issue addressed by the Corfu Channel case that is
relevant to the Northwest Passage dispute: whether the passage of
British warships through the Corfu Channel violated Albanian
sovereignty. "
The Albanian government had previously claimed that foreign
warships and merchant vessels had no right to pass through Albanian
94.

Id.at 45.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.at 52.
Id.at 57-58.
Id.at 58-59.
Id.at 60.
Corfu Channel, Judgment (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
Id.at 17-18.
ld. at 22-23.
Id.at 42.
Id.at 49.

territorial waters without the prior notification and consent of the
Albanian government.' 4 The British government vigorously protested
this position, claiming that "innocent passage through straits [was] a
right recognized by international law."' 5 The I.C.J. found that it was
"generally recognized and in accordance with international custom
that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships
through straits used for international navigation between two parts of
the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal state."'' 6
Further, the court stated that "[u]nless otherwise prescribed in an
international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to
prohibit such passage through straits in time of peace. ' "07
The Albanian government did not contest this rule of
international law directly, but instead attempted to argue that
although the North Corfu Channel was geographically a strait, it did
not qualify as an "international highway."' 18 The Albanian position
was based on the claim that the North Corfu Channel was of
"secondary importance," was not a "necessary route," and that it was
used almost exclusively for local traffic. 109 The I.C.J. began its
analysis by attempting to determine what factors were most
important in determining whether a waterway was an international
strait:
It may be asked whether the test is to be found in the volume of
traffic passing through the Strait or in its greater or lesser
importance for international navigation. But in the opinion of
the Court the decisive criterion is rather its geographical
situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact
of its being used for international navigation. Nor can it be
decisive that this Strait is not a necessary route between two
parts of the high seas, but only an alternative passage between
the Egean (sic) and the Adriatic Seas."0
In determining that the North Corfu Channel had been a useful route
for international traffic, the I.C.J. referred to records showing that
almost three thousand ships of various nationalities passed through
the North Corfu Channel over a 21-month period."' It also noted that
104. Id. at 50.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 52.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 52-53.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 53.
111. Id. at 53-54.

the channel had been used
years and that other navies
concluded that the "North
belonging to the class of
passage cannot be prohibited

regularly by the British for over eighty
also used the Channel." 2 The court then
Corfu Channel should be considered as
international highways through which
by a coastal State in times of peace."' 3

III. The Northwest Passage Dispute
Despite the generally close relationship between the United States
and Canada, the Northwest Passage has proven to be a source of
contention between the two neighbors. Driven by national economic,
security, and environmental concerns, Canada seeks to establish its
control and sovereignty over the waters of the Northwest Passage.4
As a practical matter, the United States shares many of Canada's
concerns and in the past has been willing to work with the Canadian
government to protect the Northwest Passage. 5 In contrast, the
United States is more concerned with the establishment of precedent
that would allow other nations to close off or restrict navigational
rights in other areas of the world.116
A. Canada's Position Regarding the Northwest Passage

Canada's position is that the Northwest Passage is "internal
waters" as defined by the UNCLOS in international law. Canada also
asserts that their position is supported by the reasoning of the I.C.J.
in

the

Norwegian Fisheries case.

Beginning

with

Canada's

1906

declaration of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, Canada has
consistently maintained its sovereignty claim. However, the reasoning
112. Id. at 54.
113. Id. at 55. The I.C.J. did note, however, that because technically a state
of war existed between Albania and its neighbor Greece, that Albania
would have been justified in "issuing regulations in respect of the
passage of warships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting such
passage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization.
Id.
114. SeeAddress by Minister Cannon at Launch of Statement on Canada's
Arctic Foreign Policy, INTERNATIONAL.GC.CA, http://www.international
(last
.gc.ca/media/aff/speeches-discours/2010/2010-057.aspx?lang=eng
visited Dec. 11, 2010). Minister Cannon listed the primary goals of
Canada's arctic foreign policy as exercising sovereignty, promoting
economic and social development, protecting the arctic environment,
and improving and devolving governance. Id.
115.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 59-60. Byers notes that during the Cold War the
U.S. and Canada collaborated on the DEW line of radar stations
stretching from Alaska to Greenland, as well as in the deployment of
underwater surveillance systems around the Arctic archipelago. Id.

116. See Kraska, supra note 4 at 270. Kraska identifies
core interest as "freedom of navigation." Id.

the United States

behind that claim has shifted over the years. Its initial claim in 1906
utilized a "sector" theory of delineation, claiming "everything within a
pie-shaped sector extending from the continental coastline to the
geographic North Pole.""' 7 The validity of this claim was never
recognized internationally, and was eventually dropped by the
Canadian government." 8 Currently, Canada espouses two separate
rationales for its claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage." 9
1. Canada's First Claim: Internal Waters by Historic Title
Canada attempts to support its own claim to the Northwest
Passage by historic use, similar to how Norway established its claim
in the Norwegian Fisheries case by establishing its historic use to the
waterways within and surrounding the skjaergaard. 2 ° Canadian legal
scholars point to three centuries of exploration by British explorers,
followed by the transfer of title from the United Kingdom to Canada
in 1880.12! Canadian scholars also point to legislation enacted by the
Canadian government in the early 1900s regulating various activities
within the Arctic Archipelago and annual patrols conducted by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.' 22 Noted Canadian legal scholar
Donat Pharand has pointed out that the historical title claim has a
serious flaw: none of the pre-1900 activities were combined with an
explicit claim to the waters of the Northwest Passage, and the claims
in the 1900's that did include such a claim were consistently opposed
by the United States.'23
Canadian legal scholar Michael Byers has attempted to rectify the
weaknesses in this claim by using the native Inuit's historical
occupation of the Arctic Archipelago, who ranged over both the
islands and the ice-covered waterways for hundreds of years.'24
However, even Byers has noted that in order for this claim to succeed,
Canada would need to establish that "(1) sea ice can be subject to
occupancy and appropriation like land (2) under international law,
indigenous people can acquire and transfer sovereign rights and (3)
indigenous rights holders ceded such rights, if they did exist, to
117.
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118. Id. at 43-44.
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'
Canada."125
The first element is the most problematic, as there is no
support in international law for such a proposition.'26
Comparing the Canadian claim, that the Northwest Passage
constitutes historic internal waters, with the situation in the
Norwegian Fisheries case, it is clear that Norway possessed a much
stronger historical claim to the skjaergaard than Canada does to the
Northwest Passage. Norway's historical claim included nearly a
century of expressed sovereignty over the waters of the skjaergaard,
uncontested by other states.'27 In contrast, Canada's express claims of
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage were consistently challenged
by the United States and other nations. Thus, Canada's historical
internal waters claim is likely insufficient to establish that Canada
should be allowed to classify the Northwest Passage as internal
waters. Perhaps due to recognition of these weaknesses, Canada has
sought other means to establish the Northwest Passage as internal
waters, although it has never explicitly dropped that claim as it did
with its sector theory claim.

2. Canada's Second Claim: Straight Baselines
Following the voyage of the United States Coast Guard icebreaker
USCGC Polar Sea in 1985, the Canadian Minister for External
Affairs announced the adoption of straight baselines around the entire
Arctic Archipelago, to take effect on January 1, 1986.128 This claim
was subject to official protest by the United States government. 29
The European Community also protested Canada's use of straight
baselines, stating that:
The Member States acknowledge that elements other than
purely geographical ones may be relevant for purposes of
drawing baselines in particular circumstances but are not
satisfied that the present baselines are justified in general.
Moreover, the Member States cannot recognize the validity of a
historic title as justification
for the baselines drawn in
accordance with the order. 3 °
125. Byers & Lalonde, supra note 3 at 1156.
126. Kraska, supra note 4 at 271.
127. Fisheries, supra note 79 at 48-49.
128.
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The European Community further specified that it protested
Canada's use of straight baselines on the basis that the baselines were
"excessively long and diverted too much from the general direction of
13
the mainland coast."' '
Byers attempts to use the Norwegian Fisheries case as a
justification
for Canada's application of straight baselines to
encompass the entire Arctic Archipelago and the Northwest
Passage.'32 However, Byers's argument depends on the inclusion of
Canada's historic internal waters claim for validity. In the Norwegian
Fisheries case, Norway's use of straight baselines to enclose the
skjaergaard was justified because of Norway's long-standing historical
use and the lack of protest by foreign states of Norway's sovereignty
claim. 33 Since historical use of the Northwest Passage is dependent on
the dubious contention that Inuit use of surface ice can satisfy the
usage requirement, Canada cannot establish that its claims of
sovereignty were ever accepted by the international community.
The Canadian position regarding the length of their baselines
appears to rest upon a misunderstanding of the Norwegian Fisheries
case. In that case, the I.C.J. rejected the United Kingdom's
contention that a 10-mile rule existed preventing certain baselines
from being drawn absent a historical claim.'34 However, the 10-mile
rule rejected did not relate to the length of the baseline itself, but
rather the distance from the baseline to a low-water mark.
When discussing the length of the baseline itself, the I.C.J.
approved a baseline of 38.6 nautical miles in length. 35 In contrast,
Canada's baselines surrounding the Arctic Archipelago include
baselines of nearly 100 miles in length. 36 The extreme length of
Canada's baselines makes their use questionable under international
law. Unfortunately, the UNCLOS does not define the length of
permissible baselines.
In addition, Canada's reliance on the Norwegian Fisheries case to
justify its use of straight baselines also appears to ignore one
significant difference between the Norwegian skjaergaard and the
Northwest Passage. The Norwegian skjaergaard, and most of the
waterways in question in Norwegian Fisheries, are fjords. The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "fjord" as "a narrow inlet of the

131. BYERS, supra note 5 at 53.

132.

BYERS,

supra note 5 at 54.

133. Fisheries, supra note 79 at 48-49.
134. Fisheries, supra note 79 at 31-32.
135. Fisheries, supra note 79 at 55.

136.

BYERS,

supra note 5 at 54.

'
By definition, a fjord has only a
sea between cliffs or steep slopes."137

single point of egress, as compared to a strait (or series of straits like
the Northwest Passage) which has multiple points of egress.
Thus, while Canada's use of straight baselines may be permissible
under the broadest reading of the UNCLOS, the length of those
baselines and the lack of a historical basis recognized by other nations
lends weight to the position of those nations that protest Canada's
use of strait baselines to encompass the entire Arctic Archipelago.
However, while it would be incorrect to state that international law
supports the Canadian position, neither would it be correct to state
international law rejects the Canadian position. The
that
geographically unique features of the Northwest Passage make
analogizing to previous situations difficult.
B. The United States Position Regarding the Northwest Passage

The United States position is that the Northwest Passage
constitutes an international strait between two high seas and that
foreign shipping thus has the right of transit passage.'38 This position
rests on both the UNCLOS as a codification of customary
international law and the clarification of customary international law
by the I.C.J. in the Corfu ChannelCase. The decisive characteristic of
an international strait under both the UNCLOS and Corfu Channel is
twofold: (1) the waterway must connect two high seas, and (2) it
must be used for international navigation. 3 9 Of those two factors, the

satisfies
only real area in dispute is whether the Northwest Passage
4
the second factor of being used for international navigation. 1
1. How Much Use is Enough?
The question of use is difficult to resolve because historically the
Northwest Passage has been commercially impassable due to surface
ice.' 14 The few ships that did transit the Northwest Passage did so
largely with Canadian permission, even if the ships involved did not
actively seek Canadian permission. 142 James Kraska, a U.S. Navy
137. Fjord, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fjord (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
138.

RONALD O'ROURKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CHANGES IN
THE ARCTIC: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 22 (2010),

availableat http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA517084.
139. See, e.g. UNCLOS, art. 37; Corfu Channel, supra note 99 at 53.
140. See, e.g. BYERS, supra note 5 at 54. Byers, a Canadian legal scholar,
acknowledges that the Northwest passage "clearly connects two parts of
the high seas, namely the Atlantic and Arctic oceans." Id.
141. See, e.g. BYERS, supra note 5 at 11.
142. Peterson, supra note 12 at 48. For example, permission was granted preemptively for the voyage of the S.S. Manhattan in 1969 despite not

Judge Advocate General (JAG),
use by writing:

attempted to sidestep the issue of

There is nothing in the Law of the Sea Convention to suggest
additional
tests or requirements
for recognition as an
international strait, so there is no authority for the idea that a
strait is only a strait if it meets a certain minimum threshold of
shipping traffic, a specific number of transits, a timetable or
regularity of transits, transit by certain types of vessels, or
whether the vessel is accompanied or not accompanied by
icebreakers.'43
Kraska's statement is technically correct, in that the UNCLOS does
not set a minimum threshold of shipping traffic.
However, the I.C.J.'s decision in Corfu Channel is often cited as
justification for the existence of some sort of threshold. Pro-Canadian
legal scholars point out that international shipping in the Northwest
Passage falls far short of the 2,884 ships that transited the North
Corfu Channel over a twenty-one-month period.'" However, Corfu
Channel does not necessarily establish any kind of standard for
satisfying the usage criteria of an international strait, because in that
case, the evidence showing the 2,884 transits was entered to counter
the assertion of the Albanian government that the North Corfu
Channel was not used for international shipping.145 While Corfu
Channel can serve to establish that some actual international shipping
is required to qualify a strait as an international strait, it does not
refute the assertion that a single transit of international shipping
would qualify that strait as an international strait under the
UNCLOS.
While satisfying the usage requirement of an international strait
will likely require more use than a single transit, it is simply unclear
as to how much use will be required. The situation becomes even
more uncertain when the issue of submarines are added into the
calculation. Several legal scholars believe that submarine navigation
plays a key part in motivating the United States position.'46 Under

being sought by either the United States government or the ship's
owners.

BYERS,

supra note 5 at 44-45.

143. Kraska, supra note 4 at 275.
144.

BYERS, supra note 5 at 55. Byers correctly notes that this number only
accounts for ships that had put into the port of Corfu and registered
with customs agents, and did not include ships which transited the
channel without stopping at Corfu. Id.

145. Corfu Channel, supra note 99 at 53-54.
146. See, e.g. BYERS, supra note 5 at 75, John T. Olliver, A Window of
Opportunity: The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, PROCEEDINGS

the UNCLOS, submarines invoking the right of innocent passage may
pass through the internal waters of coastal states; however, they are
required to travel on the surface. 47 When transiting through an
international strait, submarines may remain submerged. 48
The passage of non-Canadian submarines through the Northwest
Passage could potentially establish sufficient use to qualify it as an
international strait.'49 Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine
whether such transits have occurred, because movements of U.S.
Navy submarines are classified and unavailable to the public, as are
any agreements or notifications which the Canadian government may
have received. It is thus impossible to determine if submarine transits
of the Northwest Passage have occurred in a manner that would
satisfy the usage requirements of an international strait.
2. Has Canada Acquiesced to the Claim that the Northwest Passage is an
International Strait?
The passage of submarines through the Northwest Passage also
raises the issue of whether Canada has acquiesced to the United
States
position that the Northwest
Passage
constitutes an
international strait. 5 Under the general principles of international
law, a nation's practice of acquiescence can create a binding
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navy.forces.gc.ca, http://www.navy.forces.gc.ca/cms/l/l-a eng.asp (last visited Dec. 11, 2010). As diesel-electric boats, Canada's submarines
lack the ability of nuclear-powered submarines to remain submerged
indefinitely, preventing them from operating beneath the Arctic ice cap.
BYERS, supra note 5 at 75. Nuclear-powered submarines such as those
operated by the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, France,
and India, do not have this limitation.
150. BYERS, supra note 5 at 76. Byers notes that if submarine passage
through the Northwest Passage were conducted without Canadian
knowledge, the failure of Canada to enforce its claim would be excused
on the basis of ignorance. However, Byers also considers it likely that
Canada has been aware of American, French, and British submarine
movements and has at least tacitly consented to those movements. Id.

obligation.' In addition, as a general principle of law and equity,
principles of estoppel are also a valid part of international law.'52
The actions, or more specifically the lack of actions, taken by the
Canadian government in regard to the submerged movements of
submarines through the Northwest Passage creates the potential that
Canada has acquiesced to the United States and European
Community position that the Northwest Passage constitutes an
international strait. In 1995, Canadian Defense Minister David
Collenette stated publicly that the Canadian government acquiesced
to the use of Canadian waters by U.S. submarines. 153 However,
Collenette later clarified this statement by saying that while there
was no formal agreement, information on submarine activities was
shared between Canada and its allies for the purposes of safety and
minimizing interference.'54 While not conclusive, these statements by a
high-ranking Canadian official could be seen as an acknowledgement
by Canada that it had acquiesced to the use of the Northwest Passage
as an international strait by American submarines.
In addition, Canada has continually failed to take concrete action
disputing the United States claim that the Northwest Passage is an
international strait. NORDREG,
Canada's
registration system,
established in 1977 under the AWPPA, is a voluntary registration
system. 2% of international shipping fails to register with NORDREG
without legal consequence.'55 Canada does, however, have the
capability to monitor shipping through the Northwest Passage,
through its RADARSAT-2 satellite.' 56 Taken together, the Canadian
government is able to detect potential challenges to its sovereignty
claims by looking for unregistered traffic, but is unwilling to take
151. See, e.g. Right of Passage over Indian Territory, Judgment (Portugal v.
India), 1960 ICJ 5, 13-14 (Apr. 12). In that case, the I.C.J. stated that

having found that "a practice clearly established between two States,
which was accepted by the Parties as governing the relations between
them, the Court must attribute decisive effect to that practice." Id.

152. See, e.g. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area, Judgment (Can./U.S.), 1984 ICJ 4 (Oct. 12). Canada argued that
acquiescence, in relation to the recognition of rights, "[o]ne government's
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the conduct or assertion of rights
of the other party to a dispute, and the failure of protest in the face of
that conduct, involves a tacit acceptance of the legal position
represented by the other Party's conduct or assertion of rights." Id. at
131-32.
153. BYERS,

supranote 5 at 76.

154. Id.at 76-77.
155. Id. at 70-71.
156. Id. at 66-67. Byers notes that the prospect of losing RADARSAT-2's
monitoring capabilities motivated the Canadian government to maintain
RADARDSAT-2 as a vital Canadian asset. Id. at 67.

concrete steps to challenge ships that are utilizing the Northwest
Passage in defiance of their sovereignty claim. This kind of inactivity
could be considered acquiescence to the United States position that
the Northwest Passage is an international strait, because Canada has
failed to develop or exercise the capability to enforce its sovereignty
claim.
3. Was the Northwest Passage an International Strait Prior to 1985?
While Canada's historical internal waters claim has weaknesses
due to its reliance on the untested argument that indigenous peoples
can claim title to sea ice, the United States strongest historical
argument relies on the fact that Canada first utilized straight
baselines in 1985. Article 35(a) of the UNCLOS states that the right
of transit passage can still exist through an international strait that
has been classified as internal waters, where the use of straight
baselines "has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which
had not previously been considered as such."'' 57 It is for this reason
that the Canadian "historic internal waters" argument is so critical.
Even if Canada's method of using straight baselines is found to be
valid under international law, if the Northwest Passage was not
considered internal waters prior to the enactment of straight baselines
in 1985, then international shipping would retain the right of transit
passage through the Northwest Passage.'58
The question then becomes whether Canada can establish its
claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes historic internal
Canadian waters. As discussed previously, this is problematic for
Canada because explicit claims to the waters of the Northwest
Passage were protested by the United States and other nations.'59
Canada is therefore unable to point to widespread acceptance, by
foreign states, of their claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes
internal waters, a key factor in the I.C.J.'s Norwegian Fisheries
judgment.
Canada's position would be greatly strengthened if native peoples
could claim title to sea ice, but this proposition has never been tested
in any international forum. The closest analogy would be an advisory
opinion by the I.C.J. that ruled that indigenous nomadic peoples can
claim title to land, by virtue of long-standing occupation and use. 6 °
However, applying this advisory opinion to the Inuit in the Arctic
Archipelago is difficult because of the changing nature of sea ice. In
addition the Western Sahara decision did not specify what rights were
157. UNCLOS, art. 35(a).
158. UNCLOS, art. 35(a); see, e.g. Kennair, supra note 12 at 27; Kraska,
supra note 130 at 1122.
159. See supra Part III(a)(1).
160. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 2, 8-9 (Oct. 16).

gained by the nomadic peoples, only that the colonization by Spain
was not a result of occupation terra nullius, but rather through
agreements concluded with local rulers. 6 ' While this basic principle
could apply, it would require that (1) international law recognize that
peoples can claim title to sea ice, and that (2) that title would
transfer from sea ice to the waterway if the sea ice should melt. As
this appears to be an entirely new principle of international law,
Canada would need to convince other states to adopt these principles.
Thus, it is difficult for Canada to conclusively establish that, prior
to the enactment of straight baselines in 1985 the Northwest Passage
constituted internal Canadian waters. Without establishing this
historical factor, Canada's use of straight baselines does not meet the
standards established under customary international law. Unless they
can do so, the waters of the Northwest Passage would likely be
considered an international strait, with foreign vessels having the
right of transit passage.
C. Resolving the Northwest Passage Dispute Between the United States and
Canada
Given the nature of international law and international tribunals,
it is unlikely that the United States and Canada will consent to
placing this dispute before an international tribunal. Canadian
concerns regarding its sovereignty and the weaknesses in the
Canadian position make it unlikely that Canada would consent to
having a third party determine the outcome.'62 Similarly, weaknesses
in the United States' position and the concern for setting an
unfavorable precedent make it equally unlikely that the United States
would consent to jurisdiction.'63 In addition, the generally strong
relationship between Canada and the U.S. and the likelihood that the
United States and Canada have some sort of tacit agreement
regarding usage of the Northwest Passage by U.S. Navy vessels
reduces the impetus to quickly resolve this issue.'64 Thus, both nations
will likely be satisfied with the status quo and allow the present
situation to continue.
However, should the United States ratify the UNCLOS, the
dispute resolution provisions of Part XV would become relevant.'65
While Section 1 of Part XV of the UNCLOS requires states to use
peaceful means to achieve a settlement, Sections 2 and 3 set forth
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162. See supra section 0
163. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. UNCLOS, Part XV.

procedures for binding decisions.'66 The binding decision provisions,
however, are only invoked at the request of one of the parties.' 67
Given the close ties and shared concerns of Canada and the United
States, and the unpredictability of the outcome, the likelihood that
either 8 nation would invoke the binding decision provisions is probably
low.
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Thus, the means for resolving this dispute would most likely be
diplomatic and result in a document similar to the 1988 Arctic
Cooperation Agreement. 69 Due to the American priority of preserving
freedom of navigation, any agreement would likely contain provisions
similar to those in the Arctic Cooperation Agreement which preserved
the original positions of the United States and Canada. 7 ° Canada
could likely gain significant control and oversight over maritime
transit of the Northwest Passage through such an agreement,
addressing its key concerns."' While not a final or perfect solution to
the dispute regarding the Northwest Passage, such an agreement
would likely be in the best interests of both nations and place
minimal stresses on the relationship between the United States and
Canada.
IV. Conclusion
Both the United States and Canada have weaknesses in their
respective positions over the status of the Northwest Passage.
Canada's claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal
Canadian waters has never been accepted by the international
community. In addition, their usage of straight baselines exceeds
those previously accepted under international law, and their historical
claim depends on a principle that has never previously been proposed:
that indigenous peoples can gain and transfer title to sea ice. The
United States position that the Northwest Passage constitutes an
international strait relies on an extremely small number of movements
to satisfy the usage characteristic of international straits and is not
aided by the classified nature of submarine navigation. However,
formal protests by the United States and other nations do preserve a
fallback position: that even if Canada's use of straight baselines to
claim the Northwest Passage as internal waters is acceptable under
166. Id.
167. Id., Art. 286.
168. See, e.g. BYERS, supra note 5 at 78-80; Kennair, supra note 12 at 30-31;
Kraska, supranote 4 at 267.
169. See Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, supra note 29.
170. See id. at Art. 4; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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international law, this would not preclude the right of transit passage
due through the Northwest Passage due to the lack of valid historical
claims.
As a practical matter, the close relationship between Canada and
the United States means that the dispute over the Northwest Passage
is unlikely to become a matter of serious contention between the two
nations. Canada and the United States share significant concerns,
economic development,
and environmental
including security,
protection. However, these shared interests diverge greatly when the
legitimate Canadian desire to exercise and protect its sovereignty
clashes with the equally legitimate American need to protect free
transit rights throughout the globe.
This dispute is unlikely to be put before an international tribunal
that could issue a judgment unfriendly to either nation's interests.
Thus, the most likely resolution to this dispute would be diplomatic,
in a manner similar to the 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation
which provided the United States and Canada with a framework for
Passage without
operation
of icebreakers in the Northwest
unnecessarily compromising either nation's legal position. A similar
agreement could satisfy Canada's need to protect its sovereignty and
address its immediate environmental concerns, while ensuring that the
United States could avoid creating the kind of international legal
precedent that would jeopardize the principle of freedom of the seas.

